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NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's strict attitude toward municipal regulation of auto-
mobiles has been embodied in the Motor Vehicle Act as N. C. GEN.
STAT. §20-19 (1943) : "Local authorities, except as expressly authorized
. . . shall have no power or authority to alter any speed limitations
declared in this article or to enact or enforce any rule or regulations
contrary to the provisions of this article."8 4 This statute and its prede-
cessors in content may, indeed, account for the position taken by the
Supreme Court. However, the court in the Freshwater case construed a
former statute (N. C. C. S. §2601 (1922)) prohibiting ordinances con-
trary to the provisions of the chapter on motor vehicles, and said that
the same result would follow without regard to the statutory inhibition.
. Summary and conclusion. Ordinances are not permitted either to
contradict or duplicate a state law in express terms. Where there is
room for the court to go either way on the question of inconsistency
the test should be the purpose behind the general law and how best to
achieve the most effective regulation. The North Carolina decisions for
the most part seem to give effect to this practical side of the problem.
In the written opinions, however, the main issue is too often obscured
by talk about "preempting the field," "lack of authority," and "conflict."
JAMES T. PRITCHETT, JR.
Railroads-Right-of-Way-Statutory Limitation Barring
Recovery Therefor
In a recent North Carolina case,' the plaintiff railroad sought an
injunction to require defendant to allow additional tracks to be built
parallel to and within fifty feet of the original track. The charter of
the railroad gave it the right to take land of "not more than one hun-
dred feet from the center of tlae road' 2 by condemnation proceedings,
and in 1884 the railroad had entered and laid its track on the original
roadbed without bringing condemnation proceedings and without any
conveyance from the owner. The defendant, or his predecessors in
title, has been in possession of the land adjoining the roadbed ever since
it was built and is the owner of the fee. In this case no action for
compensation has ever been brought against the railroad. N. C. GEN.
STAT. §1-51(1) bars any suit against a railroad for compensation for
land taken unless brought within five years after the land has been
"See City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N. E. 114 (1917)
holding a similar statute unconstitutional as violating OHIo CoNsT. Art. XVIII
§3 giving municipalities authority to adopt police regulations not in conflict with
the general laws.
'Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51
S. E. 2d 301 (1949).IN. C. Pub. Laws 1871-2, c. 130, §7.
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entered or within two years after the road is in operation. The court
held that this statute entitled the plaintiff, upon passage of the statutory
time without action by the owner, to a right-of-way of the maximum
width which its charter allowed it to condemn.3
It was early decided in North Carolina that a railroad could enter
upon land and build its road without bringing condemnation proceed-
ings.4  When a railroad does thus enter and build its road, the owner
cannot bring an action of ejectment or trespass, but can only bring the
statutory action for compensation for the land taken.5 In this proceed-
ing either party may request that the width of the right-of-way to be
acquired and paid for by the railroad be limited, 6 but unless this is
done the railroad acquires a right-of-way of the maximum width allowed
to be condemned by its charter7 or by the general law if the charter is
silent as to width.8
Many charters9 after giving the railroad the right to condemn land
for railroad purposes, provide that in the absence of a contract with
the owner it shall be presumed that the land on which the road is con-
structed and 100 feet on either side has been granted to the railroad by
the owner. The owner is given two years to bring an action to have
his damages assessed and if not brought within that time his action is
'Under the wording of the statute it is possible that a right-of-way of 100
feet on either side of the road was acquired, but, for the purposes of this suit, the
plaintiff only contended for a right-of-way of 50 feet on either side.
'Raleigh & Gaston R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837); McIntire v. Western
N. C. R. R., 67 N. C. 278 (1872) (at page 280 the court says that the railroad
"is not obliged to know that the owner claims damages, until he claims them in
the mode provided.")
3 Dargan v. Carolina Central R. R., 131 N. C_. 623, 42 S. E. 979 (1902); Hol-
loway v. University R. R., 85 N. C. 452 (1881); McIntire v. Western N. C.
R. R., 67 N. C. 278 (1872) ; see Carolina Central R. R. v. MeCaskill, 94 N. C. 746,
751 (1886).
'See Beal v. Durham & Charlotte R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 300, 48 S. E. 674
(1904) ; Hickory v. Southern Ry., 137 N. C. 189, 199, 49 S. E. 202, 204 (1904).
'Beal v. Durham & Charlotte R. R., 136 N. C. 298, 48 S. E. 674 (1904) ; cf.
Liverman v. Roanoke & T. R. R. R., 114 N. C. 692, 19 S. E. 64 (1894) (here the
charter was similar to that of the instant case and the plaintiff landowner was
allowed to recover only for the value of the land "taken and occupied" plus the
damage to the other land. However, the judgment of the trial court gave the
railroad a right-of-way "as allowed by its charter"); Hanes v. North Carolina
R. R., 109 N. C. 490, 13 S. E. 896 (1891) ; see Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176
N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 166 (1918).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29(1) (1943) ("The width of the land condemned for
any railroad shall not be less than eighty feet nor more than one hundred
feet... ."). If the charter prescribes no maximum or minimum width then this
section applies; see Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 88, 131 S. E. 413, 415
(1926); Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176 N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 166
(1918). But cf. Dowling v. Southern Ry., 194 N. C. 488, 140 S. E. 213 (1927)
(statute not applicable because charter of railroad restricted right of way to only
so much as was "wanted or necessary").
9 E.g., N. C. Pub. Laws 1848-9, c. 82 (North Carolina R. R.); N. C. Pub.
Laws 1872-3, c. 75 (Carolina Central R. R.); N. C. Priv. Laws 1862-3, c. 26
(Chatham R. R.); N. C. Priv. Laws 1854-5, c. 225 (Wilmington, Charlotte &
Rutherford R R.) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1854-5, c. 228 (Western N. C. R. R.).
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barred. It has long been settled that the railroads with this type of
charter acquire a right-of-way of 200 feet by statutory presumption
merely by entering and building its road plus two years lapse of time
without action by the owner.' 0
However, many railroad charters contain no such two-year bar."
These charters contain a specified maximum width which it may con-
demn or, if silent, are governed by N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29 allowing
the railroad to condemn a maximum of 100 feet. In 1890 it was held
that if a railroad with this type of charter entered upon land and built
its road the owner was not barred by the three-year statute of limita-
tions on actions created by statute.12 N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 was
passed in 1893 placing a limitation on the owner's action; and the instant
case is the first to hold that a railroad with this type of charter, by
virtue of this statute, acquires a right-of-way of the maximum width
which it could condemn rather than merely a right-of-way over the land
actually occupied,'3 though previous decisions had indicated this result.
14
10 Southern Ry. v. Lissenbee, 219 N. C. 318, 13 S. E. 2d 561 (1941) ; Earnhardt
v. Southern Ry., 157 N. C. 385, 72 S. E. 1056 (1911) ; Seaboard A. L. R. R. v.
Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906) ; Dargan v. Carolina Central R. R., 131
N. C. 623, 42 S. E. 979 (1902); Carolina Central R. R. v. McCaskill, 94 N. C.
746 (1886); Vinson v. North Carolina R. R., 74 N. C. 510 (1876); Norfolk
Southern R. R. v. Stricklin, 264 F. 546 (E. D. N. C. 1920); cf. Atlantic &
N. C. R. R. v. New Bern, 147 N. C. 176, 50 S. E. 925 (1908).
The statutory presumption applies only to the owner across whose land the
road was built and not to an owner of adjoining land within the 100 foot limit.
Wearn v. North Carolina R. R., 191 N. C. 575, 132 S. E. 576 (1926).
" E.g., N. C. Priv. Laws 1893, c. 185 (Durham & Charlotte R. R.); N. C.
Pub. Laws 1870-1, c. 172 (Kinston & Kenansville R. R.); N. C. Pub. Laws
1868-9, c. 226 (Scotland Neck & Weldon R. R.) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1858-9, c. 163
(Washington & Leaksville R. R.); N. C. Pub. Laws 1835, c. 25 (Raleigh & Gas-
ton R. R.).
J"Land v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 107 N. C. 72, 12 S. E. 125 (1890)
(the court held that CODE §155(2) (1883), now N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-52(2) (1943),
was not applicable because the action was created by the Constitution and only
regulated by statute).
1" Though the railroad has a wider right-of-way, it is entitled to use only so
much as is needed for railroad purposes. The rest may be used by the owner in
any manner which does not interfere with the railroad's use. Hodges v. Atlantic
C. L. R. R., 196 N. C. 66, 144 S. E. 528 (1928) ; Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Bunting,
168 N. C. 579, 84 S. E. 1009 (1915); Coit v. Owenby-Wefford Co., 166 N. C.
136, 81 S. E. 1067 (1914); Raleigh & A. A. L. R. R. v. Sturgeon, 120 N. C. 225,
26 S. E. 779 (1897); Ward v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 109 N. C. 358, 13
S. E. 926 (1891).
1, Griffith v. Southern Ry., 191 N. C. 84, 131 S. E. 413 (1926) (The railroad
entered and built more than 5 years before this action without bringing con-
demnation proceedings. Its charter gave it only such rights as it had in Tennessee
and there its charter gave it the right to condemn so much as "may be necessary
for the said road." The court said that N. C. GEN. STAT. §40-29(1) 1943 (see
note 8 supra) would apply giving the railroad 100 feet except that it would not
apply in Tennessee.); Narron v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 122 N. C. 856, 29
S. E. 256 (1897) (The railroad entered and built more than 5 years before this
action. Its charter gave it the right to condemn 130 feet. The lower court held
that it had a right-of-way of 130 feet. The Supreme Court reversed, saying
that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51 (1) would bar the owner's action for damages, except
that, at that time, the statute exempted railroads chartered before 1868 and this
19491
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The result of the instant case and the similar cases involving rail-
roads with charters containing the two-year bar'5 seems unduly harsh on
the landowner. For an understanding of why the legislature and the
court have so favored the railroad in acquiring its right-of-way, it is
necessary to look to the history and development of the railroad indus-
try."' During the years 1830-1900 when most of the charters were
granted and the roads built, the population was sparse, land cheap, and
railroads greatly in demand. To induce investment of capital and con-
struction of railroads the legislature granted the companies large privi-
leges.1 7 It was with this in mind that the legislature granted charters
containing the two-year bar and passed N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-51. As
stated by the North Carolina Supreme Court, "when the road has been
constructed and the benefits enjoyed, although new and unexpected con-
ditions have arisen, the rights granted may not be withdrawn, although
the long-deferred assertion of their full extent may work hardships."18
WILLIAm T. JOYNER, JR.
Taxation-Duplication-North Carolina Policy Against
Double taxation, as that term is used by the courts, denotes two
distinct concepts, and an understanding of the distinction between them
is necessary to comprehend the nature of the problems arising on the
subject. To constitute true double taxation two or more taxes must be
imposed on the same property by the same governmental unit, during
the same taxing period, and for the same purpose.' Taxation by two
or more governmental units of the same income to the same person does
railroad was chartered before 1868.); see Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176
N. C. 239, 244, 97 S. E. 164, 167 (1918).
Similar cases involving the width of a right-of-way have arisen where the
owner has given the railroad a deed containing an indefinite description as to the
width of the right-of-way. In these cases the rule is that the deed conveys the
maximum width which the railroad would be allowed to condemn. Seaboard A. L.
R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 55 S. E. 263 (1906); Hendrix v. Southern Ry.,
162 N. C. 9, 77 S. E. 1001 (1913) ; Heaton v. Kilpatrick, 195 N. C. 708, 143 S. E.
644 (1928). For cases recognizing the rule, but holding that the deed restricted
the width see, Wearn v. North Carolina R. R., 191 N. C. 575, 132 S. E. 576
(1926) ; Tighe v. Seaboard A. L. R. R., 176 N. C. 239, 97 S. E. 164 (1918).
' See note 10 supra.
16 See CONNOR's HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA, Chap. 28, The Railroad Era.
1 7 See Seaboard A. L. R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 273, 55 S. E. 263, 269
(1906).
18 Seaboard A. L. R. R. v. Olive, 142 N. C. 257, 274, 55 S. E. 263, 269 (1906).
See Parks v. Southern Ry., 143 N. C. 289, 297, 55 S. E. 701, 704 (1906) where
the court, after commenting on the policy of the state when the railroads were
being built, said, "Conditions have changed, lands have increased in value and
rights deemed of little value when the roads were built have become of importance.
The courts, while endeavoring to have the law work out substantial justice, can-
not change their decisions to meet these conditions."
' COOLEY, TAXATION §223 (4th ed. 1924) ; 61 C. J., Taxation §69.
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